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Title: | Electrical fire, Incident involving aircraft OY-KIK, 22 March 1998, Kiruna airport, BD county, Sweden |
Micro summary: | While in cruise, the crew of this MD-81 suspected an electrical fire. |
Event Time: | 1998-03-22 at 1123 UTC |
File Name: | 1998-03-22-SE.pdf |
Publishing Agency: | Swedish Accident Investigation Board (AIB) |
Publishing Country: | Sweden |
Report number: | C 1999:8e |
Pages: | 17 |
Site of event: | Airspace approximately 130 nm south of Kiruna, Sweden |
Departure: | Stockholm-Arlanda Airport, Marsta, Sweden |
Destination: | Kiruna Airport, Kiruna, Sweden |
Airplane Type(s): | McDonnell Douglas DC-9-81 (MD-81) |
Flight Phase: | Cruise |
Registration(s): | OY-KIK |
Operator(s): | SAS |
Type of flight: | Revenue |
Occupants: | 103 |
Fatalities: | 0 |
Serious Injuries: | 2 |
Minor/Non-Injured: | 101 |
Other Injuries: | 0 |
Executive Summary: | The aircraft was on SAS’s regular commercial route SK1046 between Stockholm/ Arlanda airport and Kiruna airport. When the aircraft was approximately 130 NM from Kiruna airport the cabin crew reported to the pilots that there was a burnt smell coming from the forward galley 2. The smell was confirmed by the captain who associated it with that of burned bakelite or an electrical fire. He also noted that a wall in the galley area was obviously hot and that hot air was escaping from an air vent in the wall. When the pilots, despite various measures, were unable to cope with the problem, the captain decided that they should continue to Kiruna airport and land on runway 03. The captain took out the emergency check list but decided that he did not have sufficient time to use it as they were so close to the airport. The aircraft was being flow by the first officer and the captain determined that the situation did not require his assuming of control from the first officer. It can be questioned if the captain shouldn’t have taken over control of the flight and performed the landing himself, as is recommended in the SAS “Flight Operation Manual”. The landing took place with only emergency electrical power engaged, which means that the automatic brake system (ABS) and the system which prevents wheel locking (Anti Skid System) were disengaged. When the first officer braked carefully after touchdown and during engine reverse thrust the four main wheels locked which punctured three of them. After the aircraft stopped it was enveloped in smoke, which was reported to the pilots by the ATC controller in the tower. The captain then ordered the crew to perform an emergency evacuation of the aircraft on the runway. During the evacuation one of the emergency evacuation slides did not deploy automatically but had to be deployed manually. The technical investigation of the aircraft after the incident showed that the burnt smell was caused by a contained fire in or an overheating of an IC-circuit3 and it’s retainer in the water boiler control unit. The fire/overheat was likely caused by the installation of an incorrect type of circuit breaker and an incorrect LED-bulb4 in the same electrical circuit. The faulty functioning of the emergency evacuation slide was possibly caused by the incorrect installation of a release cable. It is the opinion of SHK, that the SAS emergency check list dealing with landing with the Anti Skid System inoperative is incomplete and that dealing with measures to be taken in the event of “SMOKE OR FUMES” is not user-oriented. |
Learning Keywords: | Operations - Braking Issues (General) |
Operations - Cabin or Cockpit Fire | |
Operations - Cabin or Cockpit Smoke | |
Operations - Evacuation | |
Systems - Electrical | |
Systems - Landing Gear |
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