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Title: | Uncontained Engine Failure/Fire, Valujet Airlines Flight 597, Douglas DC-9-32, N908VJ, Atlanta, Georgia, June 8, 1995 |
Micro summary: | This Douglas DC-9 experienced an uncontained engine failure on takeoff. |
Event Time: | 1995-06-08 at 1855 EST |
File Name: | 1995-06-08-US.pdf |
Publishing Agency: | National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) |
Publishing Country: | USA |
Report number: | NTSB/AAR-96/03 |
Pages: | 139 |
Site of event: | The airplane stopped on the centerline of runway 27R |
Latitude/Longitude: | N33°38'04" W084°24'50" |
Departure: | William B. Hartsfield International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, USA |
Destination: | Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida, USA |
Airplane Type(s): | Douglas DC-9-32 |
Flight Phase: | Takeoff |
Registration(s): | N908VJ |
Operator(s): | Valujet Airlines |
Type of flight: | Revenue |
Occupants: | 62 |
Fatalities: | 0 |
Serious Injuries: | 7 |
Minor/Non-Injured: | 55 |
Other Injuries: | 0 |
Executive Summary: | Abstract: This report explains the uncontained engine failure/fire on ValuJet Airlines flight 597, a Douglas DC-9-32, N908VJ, at Atlanta, Georgia, on June 8, 1995. The safety issues discussed in the report include the clarity of operations specifications for repair stations, record-keeping requirements for foreign repair stations, regulatory guidance concerning maintenance documentation, intent of “serviceable tags,” independently powered public address systems on all transport-category airplanes, flight attendant training programs and manuals, enforcement of occupant restraint requirements, notification of flightcrew of cabin fire, cabin material/fire safety standards, flight attendant attire, and quality of cockpit voice recordings. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were made to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On June 8, 1995, a Douglas DC-9-32, N908VJ, was being operated by ValuJet Airlines as a scheduled, domestic passenger flight under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. Flight 597, destined for Miami, Florida, departed gate C25 at the William B. Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, at 1855, and was cleared for takeoff on runway 27R at 1908. Five crewmembers and 57 passengers were on board. As flight 597 began its takeoff roll, a "loud bang" was heard by the airplane occupants and air traffic control personnel. The right engine fire warning light illuminated, the flightcrew of a following airplane reported to the ValuJet crew that the right engine was on fire, and the takeoff was rejected. Shrapnel from the right engine penetrated the fuselage and the right engine main fuel line, and a cabin fire erupted. The airplane was stopped on the runway, and the captain ordered the evacuation of the airplane. The flight attendant seated in the aft flight attendant jumpseat received serious puncture wounds from shrapnel and thermal injuries. Another flight attendant and five passengers received minor injuries. The pilots, the third flight attendant, and 52 passengers were not injured. The airplane’s fuselage was destroyed. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of Turk Hava Yollari maintenance and inspection personnel to perform a proper inspection of a 7th stage high compressor disk, thus allowing the detectable crack to grow to a length at which the disk ruptured, under normal operating conditions, propelling engine fragments into the fuselage; the fragments severed the right engine main fuel line, which resulted in a fire that rapidly engulfed the cabin area. The lack of an adequate recordkeeping system and the failure to use “process sheets” to document the step-by-step overhaul/inspection procedures contributed to the failure to detect the crack and, thus, to the accident. The safety issues in this report include the clarity of operations specifications for repair stations, recordkeeping requirements for foreign repair stations, regulatory guidance concerning maintenance documentation, intent of “serviceable tags,” independently powered public address systems on all transport-category airplanes, flight attendant training programs and manuals, enforcement of occupant restraint requirements, and cabin material/fire safety standards. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration. |
Learning Keywords: | Operations - Bang, pop, crack, sizzle! |
Operations - Evacuation | |
Operations - Maintenance | |
Systems - Engine - Uncontained Engine Failure | |
Other - Post-Crash Survivability |
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