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Title: | Uncontained Engine Failure, Aircraft Incident Report, Japan Airlines Flight JL726, B747-300 JA8178, Tangerang, West Java, Indonesia, 5 September 2000 |
Micro summary: | This Boeing 747-300 experienced an uncontained engine failure shortly after takeoff. |
Event Time: | 2000-09-05 at 1639 UTC |
File Name: | 2000-09-05-ID.pdf |
Publishing Agency: | National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) |
Publishing Country: | Indonesia |
Report number: | KNKT/00.06/01.01.004 |
Pages: | 73 |
Site of event: | Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta, |
Departure: | Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta, Indonesia |
Destination: | New Tokyo International Airport, Tokyo, Japan |
Airplane Type(s): | Boeing 747-300 |
Flight Phase: | Climb |
Registration(s): | JA8178 |
Operator(s): | Japan Airlines |
Type of flight: | Revenue |
Occupants: | 377 |
Fatalities: | 0 |
Serious Injuries: | 0 |
Minor/Non-Injured: | 377 |
Other Injuries: | 0 |
Executive Summary: | On September 5, 2000, a Boeing B747-300 of Japan Airlines (JAL) registration JA8178 was operating on a scheduled international passenger flight, with flight number JL726. The aircraft, which departed from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta, experienced a serious incident shortly after take-off at 23:39 LT (Local Time) or 16:39 UTC, in which the No 1 engine’s fifth low pressure turbine (LPT) disk failed, ejecting debris damaging the airframe structure and several houses in a village. There were a total of 377 persons on board including a crew of three and 14 cabin attendants. No persons on board or on the ground were injured. The engine was shut down, and after dumping 163,000 lbs. of fuel the aircraft returned to Soekarno-Hatta Airport and safely landed at Soekarno-Hatta airport at 17:36 hrs UTC. The National Transportation Safety Board conducted the incident investigation according to the standards and recommended practices of the Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. All the investigation activities in Japan and the United States were conducted under the supervision of NTSC, Indonesia, the JCAB, Japan, and the NTSB, USA. Preliminary inspection of the failed disk by visual and binocular microscope technique was done at the Institut Teknologi Bandung. The fractured disk was subsequently examined at the National Transportation Safety Board laboratory in Washington DC, using microscope, XRD and SEM techniques. Additional examinations were also conducted by Pratt & Whitney, East Hartford, Connecticut USA, using microscope, SEM, creep tests and elevated temperature fatigue tests. The CVR and FDR readouts were performed in the Japan Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission laboratory at Haneda, Japan, while the engine teardown was performed at the JAL Maintenance Facility at Narita. The findings of the examinations revealed that the failure of the disk was attributed to intergranular, elevated temperature fatigue, which had progressed from the surface of the web. The fracture originated in a blended repaired area on the front surface of the disk. The investigation concluded that blending operation, in particular on a disk or on a highly stressed part carries a high risk of residual damage (worked material or shallow cracks) remaining and these sites are potential sites for fatigue crack initiation. Therefore, the NTSC recommended that; 1. Residual damage seems to be the origin of the fatigue crack on this disk. Such damage could not be detected by available NDI method. To prevent similar occurrence, blending operation on such a particular disk should be reviewed. 2. A disk design review should be undertaken. |
Learning Keywords: | Operations - Maintenance |
Systems - Engine - Uncontained Engine Failure | |
Consequence - Damage - Airframe or fuselage |
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